Introduction
THE ECONOMICS of species extinction was initially modelled by Clark (1973) . (See also Clark and Munro 1978; Clark et al. 1979 .) It built upon Gordon's (1954) model of fishery over-exploitation to demonstrate the conditions under which open access regimes might generate non-viable stock levels of a given species. His work provided the framework for most of the analysis that has followed since. Given that the past 20 years have seen the first attempts at policies to address the problem of species extinction, the analysis of extinction has achieved some amount of policy relevance. Many of the ideas contained within the Clark and Gordon models of 'open access overexploitation' serve as the basis for the continuing discussions concerning the optimal policies for the regulation of endangered species.
However, during this period, the perception of the nature of the problem of species extinctions has altered quite a lot, from well-focused concerns about the endangerment of individual well-recognised species to a much broader concern that includes potential losses of millions of virtually unknown life forms. The latter sort of problems are usually categorised as 'biodiversity losses'. This paper constructs a general framework for addressing species extinction and biodiversity losses, by analysing the more fundamental forces affecting species and their habitats across the whole earth. This is a general problem that has usually been discussed in many different contexts, in regard to concerns about rainforests, individual species (such as the African elephant), or general genetic diversity.
The generalisation of the analysis of extinction requires that it be brought back 'on-shore', within the context of the myriad of conflicts and relationships that this implies. The original model placed the analysis of species extinction squarely within the previous literature on fishery economics. Extrapolation from this context was problematic because there are far fewer human uses competing for oceanic resources than there are for terrestrial ones. Extinction is an economic problem precisely because it is a resource allocation problem: it derives from the human allocation of the various life-sustaining resources between competing species. A more generalised analysis of extinction must take into consideration all of the various resources that are required to sustain a particular form of life within the context of the environment in which it lives.
Finally, it must be stated that the entirety of this paper is positive, rather than normative, in motivation. The object of the enquiry is to ascertain the nature of the forces that drive extinctions so that they might better be controlled; why they should be controlled is outside the scope of this paper but covered by me elsewhere (Swanson 1991 (Swanson , 1992 (Swanson , 1993 (Swanson , 1994 . Therefore, the general object of this paper is to create a more generalised framework for the analysis of both endangered species and biodiversity problems. Specifically first, to integrate the problems of endangered species and biodiversity losses; second, to bring the analysis of species extinction back 'onshore' by incorporating the other resources required for survival within the model; and, third, to illustrate the dramatically different policy implications that derive from a more generalised analysis. The paper will start in Section 2 by giving an illustration of the Clark model, and its policy implications, in the context of the African elephant. Section 3 will then integrate the problems of well-known species extinctions such as the elephant with the processes afflicting hundreds of thousands of lesser known species-the biodiversity problem. Here, the economics of extinction will be treated within a generalised framework of choice regarding productive biological assets. Then, in Section 4, this investmentbased model is revised to allow the incorporation of all the various resource constraints that operate upon a terrestrial species. Section 5 discusses the implications of these revisions to the economic model of extinctions. It demonstrates that the different types of endangerment (over-exploitation, conversions, diversity losses) are merely different routes to the same ultimate result, driven by the same fundamental forces. This indicates that the policies for addressing all forms of endangerment, extinction, and diversity losses must be created in a fashion that will address this more fundamental problem. These reforms will often require policies much different from those that have been created in order to address the proximate (as opposed to the fundamental) cause of endangerment.
2. The economics of extinction revisited: the framework and its implications Extinction problems are usually thought of in the context of a few very noticeable examples of endangered species, such as the African elephant. In fact, the decline of the African elephant during the decade of the 1980s is a classic example of the ostensibly good fit between the Clark model and actual species decline, as well as the policy implications that derive from that analysis. It will be used as a case study to illustrate the message of this paper.
During the past decade it is generally estimated that the population of the African elephant declined by about half, from 1,343,340 in 1979 to 609,000 in 1989 (Douglas-Hamilton 1989 . In addition, the trade in ivory, the principal product derived from this species, also doubled between the early 1970s and the early 1980s-from an average of about 550 tonnes to an average of about 1,000 tonnes (Barbier et al. 1990 ). On account of these trends, population modellers predicted the imminent extinction of the species, over a period of about 20 years (Caughley and Goddard 1975; Renewable Resources Assessment Group 1989) .
How does the Clark model explain the decline and possible extinction of an individual species, such as the African elephant? It does so in relation to three factors:
(i) open access to the resource; (ii) relative price to cost of harvesting the resource; and (iii) relative growth rate of the resource.
These three factors are sufficient to produce a bioeconomic model showing that the optimal stock of the resource goes to zero in the steady-state. In essence, these conditions create incentives for continued harvesting of the resource, even to an extent incompatible with the capacity of the resource to regenerate itself.
A demonstration of the Clark model
A simple model will illustrate how these conditions combine to provide the conditions for extinction. Let x represent the stock of a diverse biological resource, where y is the corresponding flow variable (the periodic harvest). The cost of harvesting the resource is then negatively related to the stock of the resource, while positively related to the flow, c(y, x). Taking an example from Dasgupta (1982) , we may say that the cost function is of the following generalised form, representing the costs of harvest.
(1)
Using the assumption (i) above, open access conditions of harvest imply that the harvest will continue until the average cost of the harvest of another unit of the resource is equal to its price, i.e. P = AC (Gordon 1954) . This is the open access equilibrium. (2) We also know the annual change in stock over time, x, will be equal to the intrinsic growth rate of the resource, H (x), less that year's harvest, y.
Combining (2) and (3) gives an equation that demonstrates that the annual change in the resource stock is: (i) a positive function of the growth rate of the resource; and (ii) a negative function of the 'harvesting effort' (which is positively related to the price-cost ratio of harvests). Bioeconomic equilibrium results where these two forces are in balance. In Fig. 1 , the intersection of these two curves occurs at the stock level that will exist in the steady state equilibrium. Bioeconomic equilibrium represents the equation between the forces of biological regeneration and societal exploitation.
The dashed line in Fig. 1 indicates the nature of the possibility of 'economic extinction '. In the case of this harvesting function, there is no intersection between the growth function and the harvest function, at any stock level. This means that the incentives to harvest the resource exist at all stock levels, and the growth of the resource is insufficient to maintain a population in the face of these pressures. The bioeconomic equilibrium is extinction. The basic principle derived from this analysis is: low growth rates combined with relatively high price-cost ratios, under the assumptions of the Clark model, result in forces pointing to the ultimate extinction of the species.
The policy implications of the original model
The policy implications of this model are straightforward. Extinctions result from low growth rates and high price-cost ratios, in the context of poorly managed access. Since it is assumed there is little to be done about affecting resource growth rates or habitat conditions, the implication is then to work through the price-cost ratio. In the context of Fig. 1 , an endangered species would be found initially in the situation of a harvest function represented by the dashed line. Any act that would either decrease the price of the resulting products, or increase the costs of the production process, would shift the harvest function downwards (to the unbroken line in Fig. 1 ) creating the possibility of a stable bioeconomic equilibrium.
The application of this paradigm leads to some fairly straightforward policy conclusions. A quick fix for the endangered species within this framework is the enforced criminalisation of the production process. This is believed to be effective because it should have two important impacts on the prevailing incentive structure: first, criminalisation should eliminate from the market some demand for the products; and second, it should increase the cost of accessing and marketing the resource. Therefore, the policy of enforced criminalisation is intended to have positive impacts working on both sides of the price-cost ratio, with, it is hoped, the resulting downward shift in the harvest function restoring bioeconomic equilibrium at a stock greater than zero. This is precisely the policy shift that occurred as a result of the decline of the African elephant in the 1980s. The international community has acted to impose an international 'ban' on the trade in ivory effective from 1990. Acting within the context of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the parties passed a resolution to list the African elephant on Appendix I of the treaty, effectively disallowing all further trade in that species' products and requiring all member states to enforce this ban (Barbier et al. 1990 ). The ivory trade had been criminalised in order to save the elephant. Was this the correct analysis of and approach to the problem of species. endangerment (Swanson 1993)? 3. The economics of extinction generalised: species extinction and biodiversity losses Despite the existence of these international and national policies to address the problem of species endangerment, the natural world is nevertheless heading toward a period of severe mass extinctions. Within the fossil record, there is evidence of about five occasions on which 50% or more of the then-existing species became extinct over a short period of time. Several of the word's most eminent scientists project a mass extinction rivalling these that is set to occur over the next century (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981; Lovejoy 1980) . Even if the projections of a 'doomsday scenario' are inaccurate, the current rate of extinction is extraordinary. Averaged over the 4.5 billion years of biological history, the long term rate of extinction is approximately nine species per million per annum. Scientists estimate that the current rate of extinction is three or four orders of magnitude above this background rate (Wilson 1988) .
Most of these extinctions are not so newsworthy as the elephant's decline, and so they go largely unnoticed. In fact, many if not most of these disappearing species are being destroyed without ever having been classified. This is known as the problem of biodiversity losses, i.e. the narrowing of the gene pool through the loss of many species as well as the loss of many of the varieties within any given species. It is the problem of the general homogenisation of the natural world, and the extinctions that are resulting from this process (Swanson 1994) . Within the framework of this paper these two problems can be considered as cases of the same general problem, only applied to more and less noticeable species.
The problem of endangered species generalised: societal asset portfolios
The problems of specific endangered species and general biodiversity losses have their sources in the same fundamental economic problem, viz. the human choice of the set of biological assets upon which society relies. Human societies must select a portfolio of assets from which they then derive a flow of benefits, and one important part of this portfolio is the range of biological resources upon which we depend. These resources are assets (stocks which generate flows) simply by virtue of being biological in nature.
One would expect in the context of a developing society, large changes in that society's portfolio to occur. One important aspect of the development process is the accumulation of new forms of capital. Given capital constraints it will sometimes be optimal to disinvest in one asset and invest the receipts in another asset; that is, it will be socially optimal to engage in conversions between assets in order to equilibrate returns. Sometimes a natural asset will be converted to a human-made asset (Solow 1974) . That is, human society will disinvest in the natural resource in order to invest in human-made capital items, such as machinery. Conversions occur between biological assets as well; a biological asset will be converted to a different form of biological asset, such as the clearing of a forest for a cattle ranch (Swanson 1991) .
It is this process of disinvestment that lies at the base of the decline of any species. Although there are various manners in which the conversion process might be manifested (the mining of stocks, overexploitation, land use conversions), the fundamental force driving species' decline is always the relative rate of investment by the human species. It is the human choice of another asset, over a given biological asset, that results in the inevitable decline of that species. Extinctions, whether of specific breeds or of general diversity, are the result of their non-inclusion in the human asset portfolio. The remainder of this paper demonstrates how this is the case.
Species as productive assets -the model generalised
The generalised model of biological extinction focuses on the investment potential of different varieties of biological resources. It is based on both the Clark model, and the Solow model of asset substitution (Solow 1974) . It analyses extinction as a process of human choice of which productive assets to retain in the natural portfolio. The general dynamic model, building upon that found in the fisheries literature, may be set up as follows (see e.g. Conrad and Clark 1987) . The following variables must be defined, each assumed to be subscripted for time. Also, the variables will all be assumed to apply to a specific diverse resource within a given country. This terminology will be retained throughout the remainder of the paper. the (constant) average cost of harvest-a function of stock level
the growth of the resource-a function of the stock of the resource r the marginal cost of capital within a country A the 'shadow price' of a unit of resource stock (equates with resource 'rent' in equilibrium)
At this juncture it is necessary to interject a few stylised facts in order to define the appropriate societal objective regarding its diverse resource stocks. First, when discussing the problem of global diversity, it is necessary for the discussion to focus on a few states in the developing world, as the vast majority of the world's biological diversity resides in a mere handful of states (McNeely et al. 1990) . Secondly, these states are some of the poorest in the world, and they are therefore justifiably interested in the maximisation of the appropriable values from their diverse resources (Swanson, 1991) . Thirdly, the greatest values that are attached to diverse resources generally flow from the developed world, where these forms of resources are relatively more scarce. These assumptions imply that the state with significant quantities of diverse resources is primarily concerned with the capture of the maximum appropriable producer surplus to be derived from its natural assets. This is the societal objective depicted in eq. (5).
This society will sove this problem in order to determine the optimal stock levels for each of its diverse resources. From the perspective of this producer/ state, species are differentially valuable as productive assets depending upon the appropriable values that they generate. Given scarce investment capital, the decision as to which species to maintain within the societal portfolio of assets will depend upon their relative productivity. For purposes of later comparisons, the optimal flow (y*) is shown in eq. (6), then the optimal stock level (x*) is depicted in (7).
where Cd is the elasticity of demand for the diverse resource.
We are concerned here with the steady-state stock levels (i.e. for i = 0, x = 0), because these are indicative of the societally targeted stock levels for this particular biological asset. Of course, this target might take quite a long time to reach, but the analysis of extinction must necessarily be concerned with the very long run; it means little to speak of a long transient phase prior to extinction, unless that phase persists for at least hundreds of thousands of years. Equation (7) implies that the resource would be maintained at a stock level that equates the return from that asset with the return from other assets. The return to the stock of a given diverse resource is dependent upon two factors: (i) the relative growth rate (which slows as the stock level reaches carrying capacity); and (ii) the cost of access-'search costs' (which decline with Figure 2 demonstrates this point. An investment-based model indicates that the stock level for each biological resource would be targeted at the level that equilibrates its returns with all other productive assets in the economy. Since the marginal return on further investments in the stocks of a given biological asset will decline, as the carrying capacity of its habitat is reached, there will always exist an equilibrium stock level for a given species. It is clear, within this framework, that the nature of an extinct resource is that of a noncompetitive asset. The dashed line in Fig. 2 represents a very slow-growing resource which fails to reach the prevailing marginal rate of return from assets within the economy. There are incentives for the conversion of the entire stock of this asset to other, more productive forms of capital in order to achieve a better return.
Therefore, slow growth relative to other assets in the economy is in and of itself a route to species extinction. Resources, even biological resources, must be competitive as productive assets if there is to be a force for their retention in a world of scarce resources. This point was first discussed in the context of the debate concerning the 'optimal harvest strategy' applicable to the blue whale; certain very slow-growing biological resources are subject to pressures for their complete disinvestment (Clark 1976; Spence 1975; Dasgupta 1982) . It was further analysed by Clark and co-authors (Clark and Munro 1978) and several others in a series of articles (Cropper et al. 1979; Cropper 1988; Swallow 1990; Swallow et al. 1990 ).
Open access regimes and investment incentives
The results derived in the previous section are true even from the perspective of a perfectly well-managed biological resource; non-competitive growth rates (8) are sufficient conditions for asset disinvestment. Slow growth is not the only route to extinction however. An alternative route to the creation of a force for disinvestment is the operation of an open-access regime. Open-access regimes can render otherwise viable biological resources largely valueless as economic assets.
The impact of uncontrolled access on a resource can be demonstrated within the generalised model set forth above, in the context of a decentralised group of resource harvesters. In this case, each of a large number of competing harvesters attempts to maximise its own profits from individual harvesting activity (yJ The maximisation problem for each individual harvester is then as follows
Open-loop Nash equilibrium conjectures will be used to determine how the competing harvesters will use the open access resource. The use of open-loop conjectures implies that harvesters do not take account of stock effects in their decision making. Nash conjectures imply that there is no strategic interaction between harvesters; each harvester takes the harvests of others as a given. Open-loop Nash equilibrium conjectures are plausible in the context of an open-access regime, precisely because open access usually implies a large number of competing harvesters. We will return in the next section to the precise meaning of an open-access regime, but at this point the sole implication is a large number of competing harvesters. Under these assumptions, the first order conditions for an optimal solution to each of the harvesters' decision problems are as follows for respectively optimal flow (for competitive entry) and optimal stock.
Open access operates to remove all incentives for investment in the diverse resource, via the long-known process of 'rent dissipation' (Gordon 1954; Cheung 1970) . That is, under open access, the shadow price of the resource stock goes to zero. With a value of zero, there are no incentives for the asset to remain invested in that particular form. Equations (9) and (10) that is, the price received from the flow of the diverse resource is equal to the costs (of the other factors) involved in its production. There is no rent accruing to the resource itself. Therefore, under open-access management regimes the resource rental value is driven to zero through competitive access.
This means that the use of an open-access regime for the harvesting of any resource is equivalent to deeming the resource as one suitable only for conversion. Irrespective of the competitiveness of the natural asset, the application of an open access regime over-rides its inherent characteristics and renders it an unworthy investment.
Conclusion-extinctions as the result of conversion
All biological resources are by their nature productive assets. Assets are kept in a developing society's portfolio on account of the appropriable flows that they return. Nature (the evolutionary process) initially endowed this world with positive stocks of all biological assets; it performed the role of allocating niches between competing life forms. Now this role has been unsurped by the human species. For whatever reason, it is now within the capacity of human societies to determine the portfolio of life forms that will continue to exist on earth; once this capacity exists, these life forms are subject to the same forces that determine the stock levels of all the other forms of productive assets under human jurisdiction. The general nature of these forces is equivalent to portfolio balancing, and the decline of individual species is the result of disinvestment. This process of conversion between assets threatens all biological assets (i.e. species) with depletion in accord with their relative productivities. The general nature of the extinction threat to all species, both the more and the less noticeable, is the same. The fundamental cause of extinction is that a species will be seen as an inferior asset, and thus be excluded from the human portfolio of assets.
The economics of extinction revised
Exclusion from the human portfolio of biological assets is a sufficient condition for biological extinction, but it is not the force that acts directly upon the species to bring about its decline. Exclusion from the human portfolio is only the most fundamental force at work; it is the 'targeting' of a zero stock level for a given species. This brings into play the forces for conversion, and then the local decision makers may select anyone of a number of different routes to the ultimate destination. These are the more consequential actions, resulting from this more fundamental force, that actually bring about the decline of the species. It is the confusion between the consequential and the fundamental that gives rise to inappropriate policyrnaking, and thus it is important to clearly distinguish between the two.
There are three distinct forms of consequential forces that actually bring about species decline. That is, the fundamental decision not to include a specific biological asset within the human portfolio may ultimately affect the stock level of that asset via:
(i) stock disinvestments-the removal of the stocks of the asset for sale and allocation of receipts to the acquisition of other, more competitive assets; (ii) base resource re-allocation-the refusal of an allocation of base resources (land, water, foods) to the asset, and allocation of these base resources to other, more competitive assets; or (iii) management services re-allocations-the refusal of an allocation of management services to the asset, and allocation of these services to other, more competitive assets.
All of these routes have the same observable effect (i.e. species decline); however, it is more important to show that each has the same fundamental source (i.e. non-inclusion in the portfolio of assets).
Investments in resource stocks
The requirement of asset competitiveness for investment in resource stocks was discussed in the previous section. As indicated in Fig. 2 , if a resource is unable to generate a competitive return, there will be the incentive to convert it into another asset form. This is the scenario of 'optimal exinction' developed by Clark (1973) . Although investment in stocks is necessary in order to avoid extinction, it is not often the case that a species is eradicated by reason of this form of stock disinvestment. For example, if there is no demand for the species' products, then there is no incentive for stock level disinvestments of this type. Therefore, inadequate growth rates do little to explain the nature of the 'biodiversity problem', i.e. the loss of millions of unknown and unclassified species.
Also, there is mounting empirical evidence that the decline of many of the well-known and well-documented species also does not fit this pattern. This is because, although there are clear and substantial markets for these species' products, their values are not being realised by their producers. For example, studies have shown that little, if any, of the rental value of the resource is being appropriated by the harvesters of many natural resources, e.g. elephants, rhinos, and live birds (Swanson and Barbier 1992; Swanson 1992d; Repetto 1988) .
Therefore, the non-competitiveness of the stocks of a resource in terms of growth certainly does generate incentives for direct disinvestment, but this does not explain a very substantial proportion of the current (and projected) extinctions. In order to explain most species endangerment and general diversity depletion, it is necessary to appeal to other considerations.
Investments in base resources
The resources required for the continuing survival of an individual species are more than one. Most obviously, in order for the species to be able to regenerate itself, there must be some non-zero stock of the species retained (see above). Second, in order for that stock to sustain itself within the biosphere, there must be an allocation of a flow of biological services, or base resources.
All living organisms are dependent upon various biological necessities for their sustenance (food, light, air, water, etc.). Since human societies now have control of these base natural resources (by virtue of their control over land-use decisions), biological assets must compete for an allocation of these resources as well. Initially, nature itself (i.e. the evolutionary process) determined the allocation of base resources between life forms, in accordance with relative fitness. Now this role has been usurped by the human species. The natural phenomenon of extinction has been translated into the socio-economic sphere because the fates of individual species are now determined within the realm of socially optimal resource allocation: the allocation by society of resources between competing life forms (Swanson 1994) .
This implies two fundamental revisions of the basic bioeconomic model. First, the bioeconomic model of extinction must be revised in order to focus on the fundamental importance of investments in these base resources for the survival of terrestrial species. What is required is the jettisoning of an implicit assumption derived from fishery economics, with the effect of bringing the economics of extinction' on shore ', Specifically, it is important to revise the model in order to provide for the possibility of competing uses for the resources upon which a species relies, and therefore to provide for the necessity of realising a competitive return for the species' use of these resources.
The growth function is the focal point for this revision of the pre-existing model. In general, a logistic form of growth function has been applied for the analysis of population dynamics for most of the past 150 years. This function relates the flow from a stock, H (x), to the level of the existing stock, x, and to the extent to which that level is less than the available carrying capacity, R. In essence, the logistic growth function implies that if there exists a vacant niche to be filled, the individuals of a species will jointly place more of their aggregate energy into reproduction in order to fill the niche. However, if the species has previously expanded to fill its niche, then most of the energy used by the species will be absorbed in maintenance rather than growth. Therefore, growth rates are linked to the existing stock of a species relative to its available niche. This provides the growth function of the general form, H(x) = x(R -x), with its distinctive logistic shape.
Since the bioeconomic model was developed within the literature of fishery economics, it has always been assumed that the carrying capacity for a given species was a fixed, exogenously-given characteristic of the seas it inhabited. And, since humans had few other competing uses for this habitat, the opportunity cost of using it for fish production was assumed to be near zero. These assumptions are wildly off the mark in regard to terrestrial resources. On land, the amount of habitat available to a given species is endogenous to the process of determining how many individuals of that species will continue to exist, and it is probably the single most important factor determining species viability in the short and medium run. The decision concerning how many base resources to allocate to a species shifts the growth function for that species, determining (in part) the rate of productivity of that species. The nature of that shift is indicated by the two different logistic functions shown in Fig. 3 , each corresponding to the same species, but with different base resource allotments. Therefore, the 'natural' growth rate of a biological resource is affected by the allotment of natural habitat. However, the cost of providing that habitat is not without a price. The total opportunity cost of the habitat equals the flow of benefits expected to be received from the best alternative use of the land, together with the potential returns available from mining the existing stock of natural resources on that land and investing the proceeds elsewhere in the economy. The cost of these implicit investments must be incorporated into the basic model determining the feasibility of investments in diverse resources (see Swallow, 1990 for related analyses).
The changes in the extinction model that these alterations imply result in the . revised societal objective function.
where PR is the price of a unit of the base resource R (land). These alterations indicate that, if this species is to continue to have the use of the resources (R) on which it depends, then it must be able to afford a competitive return (r) on those. The relevant return accords with the marginal rate of return available on investments in this society. The implicit assumption in previous bioeconomic models was that biological resources were naturally 'free goods' that did not require investment. It was believed that biological product resulted from natural processes of growth deriving from the biosphere's capture of photosynthetic energy. This is definitely true in an aggregate sense.
The earth does produce a continuous flow of biological product as the result of natural photosynthetic processes. However, the particular form that the biosphere will take is crucially dependent upon relative investment rates, i.e. on the rate at which base resources are allocated to individual species.
A determination of noncompetitiveness renders not only investments in stocks of that species inefficient, but also renders inefficient any investments in the base resources required for the sustenance of that species. Without that natural resource base the species will be undercut, resulting in its inevitable decline. This alternative route to extinction may also be illustrated within the context of this model. When the additional decision variable (R) is included in this analysis, there is an additional first order condition that must obtain in the steady state. I'his condition states that a particular species will receive allocations of base .esources (approximated by their surrogate-land allocations) only to the extent hat the species is able to generate a competitive rate of return from this use. Ihe particular life forms inhabiting a parcel of land are viewed by biologists lS an outgrowth from the energy gradients represented by that site, using that pot on earth for the appropriation of the sun's energy for regeneration and trowth (Futuyma 1986 ). Equation (12) implies that life forms must now :ompete for their 'place in the sun', subject to human decisions concerning land ise, Alternatively, a species must not only, be capable of generating a competitive eturn on its own stock values, but it must also be able to earn a competitive eturn on the ancillary resources that it requires for its sustenance. This ondition is illustrated in Fig. 4 . Therefore, a noncompetitive biological asset is subject to more than one form of disinvestment. It might be removed through an active disinvestment programme (mining of stocks for rent appropriation and asset conversion), but this does not appear empirically to be the most pervasive threat. Most of the extinctions and endangerment today are occurring without notice and those that are well-publicised usually occur without the appropriation of many rents. In most cases, extinctions are the direct result of passive 'undercutting'. That is, for most threatened life forms, the problem is an unwillingness by humans to invest in the required ancillary resources (such as the base resources required for biological survival).
Investment in management servicesfor diverse resources
Although the passive 'undercutting' of species through base resource reallocations probably explains most species endangerment and extinctions, it does not explain them all. In fact, there is a sub-set of endangerment that fits neither the 'mining' paradigm nor the 'undercutting' paradigm discussed in the preceding sections. This is the case with regard to the endangerment of those well-recognised species (rhinos, birds, elephants, etc.) whose decline appears to be most closely related to the 'over-exploitation model' discussed at the beginning of the paper. This is the model developed by Gordon (1954) and Clark (1976) in the context of the fishery, and in which the decline of a species is explained by reference to the existence of an 'open access' regime. In the over-exploitation model, species decline is believed to be 'caused' by open access forms of resource management. This is because the existence of an open access regime renders most investment uneconomic. The nature of the regime rather than the resource determines its competitiveness as an asset.
In that case, it is important to ask why productive assets potentially worthy of investment would be subjected to such a regime. The answer within this . framework is straightforward. From the perspective of the generalised investment model, it is more likely that open access regimes are caused by decisions not to invest in diverse resources, rather than a cause of such decisions. Management services are another form of ancillary resource requirement necessary for the survival of many forms of life, especially the more noticeable and charismatic species. These services can be just as critical to the survival of a particular species as are the services that flow from base resources such as land and water. If there are demand pressures that are resource-specific, open-access conditions doom such a resource to disinvestment. The failure to provide management resources for such a resource is equivalent to a decision not to provide an essential requirement for its survival; such a decision is determined by more fundamental considerations.
This point may also be generated within the analytical framework of the investment model of extinction. All that is required is a more complete listing of the essential requirements for the sustenance of a species; these are now seen to be both biological and institutional in nature. This could be considered (14) within the context of the above model by including another input, M, representing the management services allocated to the resource. These services might be considered as a 'stock', in the sense of investments in 'institutionbuilding': the creation of a management regime that will yield a flow over the course of many years of resource management. Thus the societal objective regarding diverse resource is
where S(y; M, R) is the flow of social benefits from y given the quality of resource management generated by the level of investment in management services (M) .
Optimal investment in management institutions is given by Sf M*:~=r PM Equation (14) states that the decision whether to invest in institution-building with regard to a given diverse resource depends upon the perceived benefits that will flow from such an investment. As with all other resources, those available for resource managment are scarce and competitively allocated. A resource will only receive an allocation of management services, as in the 'quality' of resource management is at its lowest possible threshold. When this occurs, we are returned to the world of the Clark model (in which 'open access' was the assumed state of nature). In this state of the world, there are no incentives to invest in any way that is associated with the unmanaged species, as the prospects for the return of future benefit flows are severely discounted. Then, all that stands between a resource and its extinction is the net costliness of its harvesting (i.e. its price/cost ratio), as is described in the Clark model.
A positive level of institutional investment (i.e. M > 0) is indeed a precondition to all other investment. However, open access regimes are not base forces for extinction, but merely links in the chain of causation between the base forces and observed extinctions. That is, the same fundamental forces that generate the general incentives for underinvestment (low relative returns) cause underinvestment in management institutions. Therefore, open access is an 'effect' rather than a 'cause' of the fundamental forces driving the extinction process, and even over-exploitation is the result of underinvestment.
Implications of the revised model of extinction
There are two sets of implications to be derived from this revised model of the extinction process. The first concerns the multiple routes to extinction engendered by diverse resource noncompetitiveness, and the integration of the various issues of resource degradation within a single framework. The second concerns the dramatically different policy implications of this revised model.
Integration of the alternative routes to extinction
There are three alternative routes to extinction for terrestrial species. These three routes are:
5.1.1. Stock disinvestment ('resource mining'). These are resources with relatively high values but low growth. In this context, there are incentives to harvest the entirety of the resource (for its high value) and to invest the funds in other assets (for their greater growth rates) (Clark 1973) . This is termed 'resource mining' within the literature. An example of this force in action may be the deforestation of the tropical hardwood forests. These trees represent substantial amounts of standing value, but they have very low growth potential. Thus it is economically rational to 'cash in' the hardwoods and invest the returns in other, more productive assets.
It has also been used to explain why it is that there may be no non-zero optimal stock level for some species, such as the blue whale (Spence 1975) . This raises the problem of 'optimal extinction ': a society's need to decide whether it will mine a species into oblivion. 5.1.2. Management resources diversion (' overexploitation '). These are resources of 'medium' value but relatively low growth. Since they are slow growing resources, they make little sense as assets; society has no incentive to invest in their growth capacity. In addition, on account of their relatively low value, they do not justify a commitment of substantial amounts of national resources for the management of the exploitation process. Then the nation may allow these resources to be depleted through unmanaged overexploitation.
Examples of this process include the depletion of many forms of wildlife: the African elephant and rhinoceros, the wild birds in trade, and many other diverse life forms. In almost every instance, the species of concern go almost entirely unmanaged in their state of origin. This is the result of a combination of demand pressures and state neglect or criminalisation. For example, the trading in wildlife or its products is prohibited by law in almost all South American countries, resulting in the maintenance of a trade under unmanageable conditions. Similarly the taking of ivory has been illegal throughout Sub-Saharan Africa in most countries for the past 20 years. Such a legal structure renders the creation of effective management regimes difficult in the context of open forests and savannahs. Combined with underfunding, the prohibition amounts to the erection of a tacit open access regime.
Base resource conversion ('biodiversity depletion'
). These are resources that are of little or no known individual value to humans. The own-stock value of such resources does not place any survival constraint upon the species, but the costs of the other resources they require become an almost insurmountable hurdle. No living species can persist without an allocation of the ancillary resources they require, and the competition for these resources is the one that is resulting in the removal of the majority of life forms endangered today.
An example of this process is the depletion of many types of virtually unknown life forms (e.g. plants and insects) when land is deforested and converted to other forms of use, such as cattle ranching. This branch of the force for extinction is generally termed the 'biodiversity problem '.
Hence, it can be seen that three of the most-discussed issues in the literature on environment and development (resource mining, overexploitation, and biodiversity depletion) are all alternative outcomes from the same fundamental social process. Each is a possible outcome of the development process as applied to living resources with various combinations of innate characteristics (relative value, relative growth). If a resource has a high relative value and growth rate, then it attracts investment and is unthreatened by the development process. However, if a resource has either low value or low growth, then it is subject to disinvestment pressures via one of the routes outlined above. At base, however, it is the nature of the development process itself (the rebalancing of the national portfolio of assets) that is driving the depletion and endangerment of biological diversity.
Rent appropriation and investment incentives
Although there are these three alternative routes to extinction, they are all consequential not fundamental causes of extinction. As was shown in Section 4, each of these forces is the consequence of the more fundamental determination that the biological asset is unworthy of investment. The crucial difference between these models for policy purposes is the comparative statistics analysis regarding the impact of the price-cost ratio on harvesting incentives. In the Clark model, as set out in Section 2, the impact of an increased price-cost ratio on the resource was unambiguous. It generated enhanced incentives for harvesting, without a concomitant increase in the resource flow or stock levels (as the growth function was exogenous to the model). This resulted in an unambiguous increase in the threat to the viability of the species.
In this model, the implications of an increased price-cost ratio can be very different. It all depends upon the inherent characteristics of the species. If the species is perceived to be of high or medium value, but very low growth, then a change in the price of the species' products cannot alter its ultimate fate; it will be targeted toward extinction in any event. However, if the species has a significant rate of growth, then an increase in its value may have the effect of making investments in its ancillary resources economically worthwhile. Then an increased price might actually generate the conditions under which the species might avoid extinction.
For example, in the context of eq. (12), the effect is unambiguous. An increase in rent capture (e.g. resulting in an increase in the equilibrium level of A in eq. (12)) increases the relative rate of return for this species (i.e. the right-hand side of eq. (12)). More lands may be made available to the species because this species is now better able to 'pay its way'. This analysis applies equally to the allocation of management services to the diverse resource. If social benefits are defined to be equal to at least the sum of all individual harvests of the species, then an increase in the per unit appropriable value will increase the incentives to invest in this factor as well. In general, enhanced rent appropriation will enhance the incentives to invest in the ancillary resources required for the survival of this species. This may also be depicted by means of a 'shifting out' of the rate of return curves in Figs 4 and 5. In essence, the increase in rent value has increased the investment-worthiness of the diverse resource with respect to the ancillary resources it requires, and hence the ultimate survivability of the species. Therefore oR* _ . >0 OA
Of course, this result does depend upon the initial conditions in which the diverse resource is found and the magnitude of the change in price. If the resource is initially subject to disinvestment by reason of the diversion of management services and it is perceived to be unworthy of investment, then it will already be subject to an 'open-access' regime. Under the circumstances of an open-access regime, a marginally increased rental value will only increase the rate of species decline, while maintaining the inefficient management regime in place. However, this does not mean that the policy implications of this model are context dependent, only that the reforms required may be more drastic under some circumstances than in others. It may be necessary to both subsidise the start-up costs with regard to institution-building in some contexts, while simultaneously enhancing the rental value of the resource to create incentives for ongoing investment.
In any event, it is clear that a species that is subject to an open access regime cannot be saved through a policy of 'rent destruction' in the long run, it can only be shifted between the various avenues to extinction. If a species is perceived as being unworthy of investment, then a reduction in its marketed value will simply render it more likely to be lost by reason of base resource conversion and less likely to be lost by reason of management services diversions. This change in policy cannot save any terrestrial species, only change the proximate cause of its decline.
The only policies that can alter the ultimate fate accorded by human society to any particular species are those that address the fundamental cause of decline: perceived investment-unworthiness. It was previously mentioned that portfolio reconstruction occurs as a matter of fact within the development process, and this might have been taken to imply that these declines in diversity are unavoidable. This is not the case, simple because there are alternative paths available for development; not every country need base its portfolio on the same set of assets. Opting for the same development path as used by the previous states is the safe option, but not necessarily the optimal route, even for the developing state itself. What is required is some manner of international institution that will attract developing countries toward diverse development paths, enabling them to disavow the customary routes (Swanson 1994) . This implies that diverse resources must be accorded very substantial values, including market values, if they are to receive the investments that they require for their survival. The policy of 'demand destruction' is at odds with the fundamental solution concept to the problem of endangered species and biodiversity decline.
Conclusion
Even biological resources are now economic resources, in the sense that human societies have control over the terrestrial biosphere and human decisions on resource allocations will determine which life forms will continue to exist into the future. Given that humans have usurped this power from nature, the purpose of this paper has been to identify the characteristics of the resources that will be in decline under the circumstances and the nature of the policies that might alter their fate. The answer to both questions lies in the capacity of the resource (present and future) to attract human investment.
Although the fundamental force causing extinctions is disinvestment, this may occur via a number of different routes: 'resource mining', 'land use conversions', or 'over-exploitation'. These are all alternative routes that lie between the society's determination of investment-unworthiness and the ultimate extinction of the resource. The choice between the routes depends only upon the relative value and growth rate of the resource. In any event, it is only the highvalue/high-growth resources that will ultimately survive. For this reason policies based on reducing the value of a resource can only have the effect of altering its route to extinction.
All of these environmental problems have their source in the developmental process. Developing countries are those which are currently engaging in the most dramatic rebalancing of their national portfolios of natural assets. Those resources which are under threat are those which are perceived to be unworthy of significant investment for purposes of development. The answer is for the peoples of other countries who are concerned about these resources to create the conditions under which the resource is viewed more favourably as an asset. This will allow some countries to consider the option of developing down paths built upon a diversity of assets.
